The Spread is Close to Dead
Posted: Mon Jul 30, 2012 10:22 am
The spread offence was first introduced as an innovative offence that would enable an underdog team to compete with more powerful teams at the college level. By moving away from a power running game, where an underdog team would struggle against a powerhouse defense, the spread offence gave less talented teams a shot at victory.
All the spread initially needed was a smart quarterback who would release the football quickly and some speedy receivers spread across the field. The fullback was removed from the offence and an additional receiver was added. Spread offences, at times, also took their tailback out of the offence and added another receiver to the mix. The concept was that the offensive line was mainly needed for pass blocking; the running attack was used sparingly to keep opposition defenses off balance, as the spread was mainly a passing offence.
With receivers spread across the playing field, the strategy was to find seams in the opposition zone defense and to find them quickly. The strategy also was based on the belief that it would be more difficult for teams to blitz, needing their linebackers to help out in defending the passing attack. The spread offensive philosophy also maintained, with fewer defenders in the box, that a fast tailback could break a running play for a long gain, once he got past the initial line of scrimmage.The quarterback lined up in the shotgun, enabling him to have already established his drop and to get rid of the football faster.
The spread offence spread to the pros, with a number of NFL teams adopting the spread, including the New England Patriots, who were one of the first to see its advantages. In the CFL, John Hufnagel created the CFL version of the spread offence. Using five and six receivers, he was able to create mismatches with fast receivers being covered by slower linebackers.
As pro teams as New England and Calgary enjoyed success with the new offence other teams began to copy and soon the spread offence was being employed by most NFL and CFL offences.Jacques Chapdelaine, who came over with Wally Buono, to join our Lions, was a spread offence addict, having learned the intriqicies of the offence from George Cortez in Calgary and he had adapted it from the Hufnagel playbook.
However, as pro defenses began to see more and more of it and as they struggled to stop it, they learned to adapt to it. In the CFL, innovative coaches as Dave Ritchie, here in B.C. and Rich Stubler, in Toronto, made numerous changes to defensive strategy and personnel, in order to shut down its advantages.
Those changes were numerous. They included many different types of defensive strategy. One of those was to only rush three defenders on passing downs while dropping nine into coverage. They mixed this up by blitzing while using a zone defense behind the blitz to take away the long pass. They tightened coverage, with the advantage of many defenders, defending the pass in layers. Not having to worry about the opposition running game as much, they went with lighter, faster defensive ends who could get to the quarterback more quickly and they moved to using bigger defensive tackles or nose guards, who could plug the middle, since the spread offence focused on the inside running attack.
Personnel changes also included using a nickel back as a hybrid linebacker who was usually a converted pass defender. Defenses also began to take out one or two linebackers and bring in additional defensive backs on passing downs. New positions arrived on defense, from dime backs to the eighth back, or rover position.Finally, defenses began to mix coverages and even began to drop defensive ends and defensive tackles into coverage, while blitzing a linebacker or defensive back into coverage to mix the blitz. We saw players like Brent Johnson intercept a football 25 yards deep on occasion.
The spread offence has passed its nadir but coaches as Chapdelaine were stuck into it but he was not alone.As defenses changed their strategies, quarterbacks were not able to read defenses as quickly or find receivers wide open quickly. The blitzes soon began to become effective and our Leos were a good example of the quarterback position enduring tremendous punishment as the sack totals piled up and the concussions and injuries to the position mounted.
The running attack was also simplified in the spread offence. Its main running play was the zone read, with the offensive line zone blocking in unison and the tailback mostly focused on the cutback play. However, defenses stopped reacting to the offensive line slanting one way with their blocks and the tailback stepping that way as well, before making his cutback. The defensive line began to stay home on the backside of the play and the big defensive tackles began to mob the running back.
Without a strong running game, without the ability of successful play action to keep a defense guessing, with little motion (most receivers were lineup up with the slot back getting a running start) defenses could key against the pass and pass defenders could just tee up to pass rush the quarterback. The quarterback, mostly stuck in the pocket, became an easier target. As Dean Valli commented during our early losing streak last season...that when a defense knows that you are going to pass from the pocket 20 times in a row, they can just line up and take their shots.
What was obvious was that pro offences needed to adapt again but innovation and change often doesn’t happen easily and often has to be forced. Defenses were forced to change to stop the spread and offences needed to be forced to move away from the spread offence.
In the NFL, New England was one of the first teams to move away from the spread offence and go multi-formational. They reintroduced the tight end to their offence and began to use two tight ends often.
In the CFL, coaches such as Marc Trestman began to tinker with the spread offence and began to adapt.
However, the most sweeping change took place right here in B.C. with our B.C. Lions. 'Chap Ball', as I often referred to it, was devoted to the spread offence, more than any offence in the CFL. However, its weaknesses had been exposed. Without the ability to run outside, our running game was swallowed up by its simplistic strategy of running between the tackles, using the singular zone read play. Our quarterbacks were being pressured and sacked at will, as defenses mainly used the zone blitz against us, dared us to throw deep as they covered us tight, knowing we liked the shorter passing attack.
Without an effective running game, they ignored any play action play as a run. They gave Geroy Simon special attention and tried to take away our first read. By taking away the quick pass to our favorite receivers, the blitz got to us.
Even during the days of having all-stars as Rob Murphy and Jason Jiminez, along with experienced center and guard Angus Reid and Kelly Bates, we led the league in giving up the most quarterback sacks. Our offence was predictable and our tendencies well known to opposition defenses.
And then, starting the 2011 season at 1-6, after two disappointing seasons prior to last year’s horrible start, we got a bye week. The fans were starting to howl and the press and media began to focus on the coaching staff’s lack of success, rather than continuing to buy their previous constant response that our lack of success was due to a lack of player execution.,
Chapdelaine said he was going to take a mirror to himself and look at what we were doing. Whether the offensive strategy changes came from Wally taking the reins off Chapdelaine or whether Chapdelaine was visited one night by the three Ghosts of Football Past, Present, and Future is hard to determine but something began to seriously happen and we began to win.
The simple explanations were that the addition of Arland Bruce had created a new dimension to our offence or that Lulay began to emerge as a leader and quarterback who could get it done. However, they were only a part of the story of the new offence that began to emerge.
'Chap Ball' began to slowly fade into background as a new offence, which I entitled 'Jaques Ball', took its place. It was different in so many ways and by the end of the season it was obvious that we had changed to a new brand of offence that was multi-dimensional, used a variety of personnel packages, was focused more on a better run/pass balance, and had so many new elements that we had not seen before.
What was different?
First of all, our entire blocking scheme was changed from a zone blocking scheme to a completely different approach to both run and pass blocking. Secondly, our vanilla running attack was completely revamped into an arsenal of running plays from direct snaps, Wildcat formations, pitch tosses, shovel passes, etc that left defenses stunned. We had introduced the receiver reverse earlier in the season and it remained a part of the arsenal. Suddenly we could attack the edge with our running attack and that caused defenses lots of problems.
We began to use more and more formations that protected our quarterback on first down. We began to use Lumbala more and more either as a tight end or off-set in the backfield to provide extra protection for the pass as well as being able to block for the run. We also added another blocker by using a lineman as an extra blocking tight end on first downs.
We began to use a tremendous amount of motion in our offence, with receivers moving all over the place prior to the snap. With our running game more dangerous and the additional motion, we now began to use a lot more misdirection play action which enabled Lulay to roll out or move the pocket for his passes. The new blocking scheme combined with the improved running attack and play action bought Lulay more time to throw. He had more time to read the defense and the receivers also had more time to get open. Mismatches were also created with the motion and often the receivers had a running start on the defensive back who was trying to cover them.
Harris became an important weapon in the passing attack. Most of the time, in the past, we had kept the tailback in to block for the passing game and then we had begun to use Jamal Robertson on swing passes to negate the blitz but opposition defenses were on to that strategy. Instead we began to use Harris out of the backfield in a number of ways, including slipping him upfield to find the seam in the zone.
Our passing attack began to evolve more and more as we used our receivers in multiple positions. We began to use wide bunch formations, to stack receivers, and to not have receivers locked into position or even to one side of the field or the other until just prior to the snap of the football. And to add misery to opposition defenses, we even ran specific plays like a fake dive, fake reverse, and deep throw that we had never done in the past. We still used the spread offence but it was only now a part of a multi-dimensional package.
And finally we introduced so many anti-blitz strategies that it became very difficult to sack our quarterback and Lulay’s mobility just made it that much tougher for the defense to come up with a quarterback sack. Lulay also began to run upfield more and to his left, reducing his tendency to run wide and deep to his right. When things broke down, he took off and made defenses pay.
No longer were we a predictable, vanilla, spread offence team. We had emerged into a dangerous, attacking, unpredictable, and exciting offence. I have often wondered how quarterbacks like Dave Dickenson, Casey Printers and Buck Pierce would have played in this present offence. We know that we were able to win and lead the league in touchdowns in 2007 and all we did that season was make our running attack more of a feature so my feeling is that our quarterbacks of the past would have been so much better with the present tools that Lulay has been given.
And so, as this story unfolds, Chapdelaine has gone from being the most beleaguered offensive coordinator in the league to its best. Dickenson is stuck in the spread offence in Calgary and Marc Trestman is trying to get ahead of the curve again in Montreal. Cornish is struggling with the vanilla running attack employed there in Calgary. Chap’s offence will be the one that is the most copied in the weeks and seasons ahead in the CFL.
Rather than being a particular style of offence 'Jaques Ball' incorporates the best of many styles with a multi-faceted and innovative approach. It’s an offence that attempts to utilize all our offensive personnel at their strengths and it can hurt a defense in so many ways.
The stories that are written in the press focus on the talents of Simon, the development of Lulay into a top tier quarterback, the emergence of Harris as the CFL’s most dynamic tailback, the dedication and impact of Arland Bruce, or the emergence of Gore. However, the most important aspect of our offensive success, which began last year and played such a key role in our Grey Cup season, as well as playing such a key role in our domination of Calgary on Saturday night is our new offensive system and play calling.
It may have taken too long in arriving but now that it has arrived, it’s a treat to watch. From the ashes has emerged an offence that is full of fire and explosiveness that is giving defensive coordinators nightmares.
All the spread initially needed was a smart quarterback who would release the football quickly and some speedy receivers spread across the field. The fullback was removed from the offence and an additional receiver was added. Spread offences, at times, also took their tailback out of the offence and added another receiver to the mix. The concept was that the offensive line was mainly needed for pass blocking; the running attack was used sparingly to keep opposition defenses off balance, as the spread was mainly a passing offence.
With receivers spread across the playing field, the strategy was to find seams in the opposition zone defense and to find them quickly. The strategy also was based on the belief that it would be more difficult for teams to blitz, needing their linebackers to help out in defending the passing attack. The spread offensive philosophy also maintained, with fewer defenders in the box, that a fast tailback could break a running play for a long gain, once he got past the initial line of scrimmage.The quarterback lined up in the shotgun, enabling him to have already established his drop and to get rid of the football faster.
The spread offence spread to the pros, with a number of NFL teams adopting the spread, including the New England Patriots, who were one of the first to see its advantages. In the CFL, John Hufnagel created the CFL version of the spread offence. Using five and six receivers, he was able to create mismatches with fast receivers being covered by slower linebackers.
As pro teams as New England and Calgary enjoyed success with the new offence other teams began to copy and soon the spread offence was being employed by most NFL and CFL offences.Jacques Chapdelaine, who came over with Wally Buono, to join our Lions, was a spread offence addict, having learned the intriqicies of the offence from George Cortez in Calgary and he had adapted it from the Hufnagel playbook.
However, as pro defenses began to see more and more of it and as they struggled to stop it, they learned to adapt to it. In the CFL, innovative coaches as Dave Ritchie, here in B.C. and Rich Stubler, in Toronto, made numerous changes to defensive strategy and personnel, in order to shut down its advantages.
Those changes were numerous. They included many different types of defensive strategy. One of those was to only rush three defenders on passing downs while dropping nine into coverage. They mixed this up by blitzing while using a zone defense behind the blitz to take away the long pass. They tightened coverage, with the advantage of many defenders, defending the pass in layers. Not having to worry about the opposition running game as much, they went with lighter, faster defensive ends who could get to the quarterback more quickly and they moved to using bigger defensive tackles or nose guards, who could plug the middle, since the spread offence focused on the inside running attack.
Personnel changes also included using a nickel back as a hybrid linebacker who was usually a converted pass defender. Defenses also began to take out one or two linebackers and bring in additional defensive backs on passing downs. New positions arrived on defense, from dime backs to the eighth back, or rover position.Finally, defenses began to mix coverages and even began to drop defensive ends and defensive tackles into coverage, while blitzing a linebacker or defensive back into coverage to mix the blitz. We saw players like Brent Johnson intercept a football 25 yards deep on occasion.
The spread offence has passed its nadir but coaches as Chapdelaine were stuck into it but he was not alone.As defenses changed their strategies, quarterbacks were not able to read defenses as quickly or find receivers wide open quickly. The blitzes soon began to become effective and our Leos were a good example of the quarterback position enduring tremendous punishment as the sack totals piled up and the concussions and injuries to the position mounted.
The running attack was also simplified in the spread offence. Its main running play was the zone read, with the offensive line zone blocking in unison and the tailback mostly focused on the cutback play. However, defenses stopped reacting to the offensive line slanting one way with their blocks and the tailback stepping that way as well, before making his cutback. The defensive line began to stay home on the backside of the play and the big defensive tackles began to mob the running back.
Without a strong running game, without the ability of successful play action to keep a defense guessing, with little motion (most receivers were lineup up with the slot back getting a running start) defenses could key against the pass and pass defenders could just tee up to pass rush the quarterback. The quarterback, mostly stuck in the pocket, became an easier target. As Dean Valli commented during our early losing streak last season...that when a defense knows that you are going to pass from the pocket 20 times in a row, they can just line up and take their shots.
What was obvious was that pro offences needed to adapt again but innovation and change often doesn’t happen easily and often has to be forced. Defenses were forced to change to stop the spread and offences needed to be forced to move away from the spread offence.
In the NFL, New England was one of the first teams to move away from the spread offence and go multi-formational. They reintroduced the tight end to their offence and began to use two tight ends often.
In the CFL, coaches such as Marc Trestman began to tinker with the spread offence and began to adapt.
However, the most sweeping change took place right here in B.C. with our B.C. Lions. 'Chap Ball', as I often referred to it, was devoted to the spread offence, more than any offence in the CFL. However, its weaknesses had been exposed. Without the ability to run outside, our running game was swallowed up by its simplistic strategy of running between the tackles, using the singular zone read play. Our quarterbacks were being pressured and sacked at will, as defenses mainly used the zone blitz against us, dared us to throw deep as they covered us tight, knowing we liked the shorter passing attack.
Without an effective running game, they ignored any play action play as a run. They gave Geroy Simon special attention and tried to take away our first read. By taking away the quick pass to our favorite receivers, the blitz got to us.
Even during the days of having all-stars as Rob Murphy and Jason Jiminez, along with experienced center and guard Angus Reid and Kelly Bates, we led the league in giving up the most quarterback sacks. Our offence was predictable and our tendencies well known to opposition defenses.
And then, starting the 2011 season at 1-6, after two disappointing seasons prior to last year’s horrible start, we got a bye week. The fans were starting to howl and the press and media began to focus on the coaching staff’s lack of success, rather than continuing to buy their previous constant response that our lack of success was due to a lack of player execution.,
Chapdelaine said he was going to take a mirror to himself and look at what we were doing. Whether the offensive strategy changes came from Wally taking the reins off Chapdelaine or whether Chapdelaine was visited one night by the three Ghosts of Football Past, Present, and Future is hard to determine but something began to seriously happen and we began to win.
The simple explanations were that the addition of Arland Bruce had created a new dimension to our offence or that Lulay began to emerge as a leader and quarterback who could get it done. However, they were only a part of the story of the new offence that began to emerge.
'Chap Ball' began to slowly fade into background as a new offence, which I entitled 'Jaques Ball', took its place. It was different in so many ways and by the end of the season it was obvious that we had changed to a new brand of offence that was multi-dimensional, used a variety of personnel packages, was focused more on a better run/pass balance, and had so many new elements that we had not seen before.
What was different?
First of all, our entire blocking scheme was changed from a zone blocking scheme to a completely different approach to both run and pass blocking. Secondly, our vanilla running attack was completely revamped into an arsenal of running plays from direct snaps, Wildcat formations, pitch tosses, shovel passes, etc that left defenses stunned. We had introduced the receiver reverse earlier in the season and it remained a part of the arsenal. Suddenly we could attack the edge with our running attack and that caused defenses lots of problems.
We began to use more and more formations that protected our quarterback on first down. We began to use Lumbala more and more either as a tight end or off-set in the backfield to provide extra protection for the pass as well as being able to block for the run. We also added another blocker by using a lineman as an extra blocking tight end on first downs.
We began to use a tremendous amount of motion in our offence, with receivers moving all over the place prior to the snap. With our running game more dangerous and the additional motion, we now began to use a lot more misdirection play action which enabled Lulay to roll out or move the pocket for his passes. The new blocking scheme combined with the improved running attack and play action bought Lulay more time to throw. He had more time to read the defense and the receivers also had more time to get open. Mismatches were also created with the motion and often the receivers had a running start on the defensive back who was trying to cover them.
Harris became an important weapon in the passing attack. Most of the time, in the past, we had kept the tailback in to block for the passing game and then we had begun to use Jamal Robertson on swing passes to negate the blitz but opposition defenses were on to that strategy. Instead we began to use Harris out of the backfield in a number of ways, including slipping him upfield to find the seam in the zone.
Our passing attack began to evolve more and more as we used our receivers in multiple positions. We began to use wide bunch formations, to stack receivers, and to not have receivers locked into position or even to one side of the field or the other until just prior to the snap of the football. And to add misery to opposition defenses, we even ran specific plays like a fake dive, fake reverse, and deep throw that we had never done in the past. We still used the spread offence but it was only now a part of a multi-dimensional package.
And finally we introduced so many anti-blitz strategies that it became very difficult to sack our quarterback and Lulay’s mobility just made it that much tougher for the defense to come up with a quarterback sack. Lulay also began to run upfield more and to his left, reducing his tendency to run wide and deep to his right. When things broke down, he took off and made defenses pay.
No longer were we a predictable, vanilla, spread offence team. We had emerged into a dangerous, attacking, unpredictable, and exciting offence. I have often wondered how quarterbacks like Dave Dickenson, Casey Printers and Buck Pierce would have played in this present offence. We know that we were able to win and lead the league in touchdowns in 2007 and all we did that season was make our running attack more of a feature so my feeling is that our quarterbacks of the past would have been so much better with the present tools that Lulay has been given.
And so, as this story unfolds, Chapdelaine has gone from being the most beleaguered offensive coordinator in the league to its best. Dickenson is stuck in the spread offence in Calgary and Marc Trestman is trying to get ahead of the curve again in Montreal. Cornish is struggling with the vanilla running attack employed there in Calgary. Chap’s offence will be the one that is the most copied in the weeks and seasons ahead in the CFL.
Rather than being a particular style of offence 'Jaques Ball' incorporates the best of many styles with a multi-faceted and innovative approach. It’s an offence that attempts to utilize all our offensive personnel at their strengths and it can hurt a defense in so many ways.
The stories that are written in the press focus on the talents of Simon, the development of Lulay into a top tier quarterback, the emergence of Harris as the CFL’s most dynamic tailback, the dedication and impact of Arland Bruce, or the emergence of Gore. However, the most important aspect of our offensive success, which began last year and played such a key role in our Grey Cup season, as well as playing such a key role in our domination of Calgary on Saturday night is our new offensive system and play calling.
It may have taken too long in arriving but now that it has arrived, it’s a treat to watch. From the ashes has emerged an offence that is full of fire and explosiveness that is giving defensive coordinators nightmares.